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Abstract
Wepresent a translation that reduces epistemic operators to strategic op-
erators in the context ofmodel checking. The translation is a refinement
of the one from [7, 9], and it improves on the previous scheme in two
ways. First, it does not suffer any blowup in the length of formulae (the
one from [7, 9] did). Second, the new translation is defined in a more
general setting: additional constraints can be imposed on strategy pro-
files that agents can execute; we show that the translation is still valid in
such a general case.
1 Introduction
Modal logics of multi-agent systems usually combine several dimensions.
Knowledge, time, actions, strategic abilities, norms/obligations, intentions,
desires etc. can all be involved in a description of an agent system. This
way,modal logic can support sufficiently realistic descriptions of agents. But
there is a price to pay: such multi-modal logics are usually harder to han-
dle semantically as well as algorithmically. Thus, a designer is usually faced
with the task of finding a good tradeoff between a “clean” logic with few
modalities (and clear overall semantics) and a "realistic" languagewithmany
modalities (where it is not immediately visible how parts of the semantic in-
terfere). A reduction method that allows to express one modality with the
others offers two kinds of advantage. In terms of theory, it allows to make
the logic “cleaner”, and study its theoretical properties (semantics, compu-
tational complexity) in a simpler environment. On the practical side, we
can reuse the advances in, say, model checking of one sort of modality to
improve the techniques used for dealing with the other dimensions.
In [7, 9], we proposed how epistemic modalities can be equivalently ex-
pressed by strategic operators in the context of model checking. Formally,
it was done by a reduction of ATEL model checking to ATL model checking.
1
What Agents Can Achieve
The reduction was polynomial in almost every respect. Unfortunately, the
length of formulae could suffer exponential blowup (although the number
of different subformulae in the formula could increase only linearly). We ar-
gued that, for most model checking algorithms, it would not increase the
verification time. Still, it is a flaw that makes using the reduction awkward,
at least for theoretical purposes. The aim of this Technical Report is to pro-
pose a slight update of the reduction that does not suffer from the blowup
any more. Moreover, we point out that the reduction can be used even if we
impose some “behavioral constraints” on the strategies that can be played by
agents. Thus, the method can be used also for variants of ATL where we as-
sume that the agents can only play in a uniform [12], socially acceptable [18],
or rational way [10].
Our presentation here is based on some material from [7, 9]. It should be
also mentioned that the original reduction was inspired by [16], and shared
some similarities with [20] (although the reduction proposed in the latter
paper had a much more limited scope). Our presentation of strategic con-
straints is based on the approach of [10].
2 What Agents CanAchieve
ATL is a logic that allows to reason about what agents can achieve in game-
like scenarios. As it does not include imperfect information in its scope, it
can be seen as a logic for reasoning about agents who always have complete
knowledge about the current state of affairs.
2.1 ATL: Ability in Perfect InformationGames
ATL [1, 2] can be understood as a generalization of the branching time tem-
poral logic CTL [3, 4], in which path quantifiers are replaced with so called
cooperation modalities. The formula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ, where A is a coalition of agents,
expresses that A have a collective strategy to enforce ϕ. ATL formulae in-
clude temporal operators: “ h” (“in the next state”), 2 (“always from now
on”) and U (“until”). Operator 3 (“now or sometime in the future”) can be
defined as 3ϕ ≡ TU ϕ. Similarly to CTL, every occurrence of a temporal op-
erator is immediately preceded by exactly one cooperation modality.1 The
broader language of ATL∗, in which no such restriction is imposed, is not dis-
cussed in this paper.
Formally, the recursive definition of ATL formulae is:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 hϕ | 〈〈A〉〉2ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ
1 The logic to which such a syntactic restriction applies is sometimes called “vanilla” ATL
(resp. “vanilla” CTL etc.).
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where A is a set of agents. Example ATL properties are: 〈〈jamesbond〉〉3win
(James Bondhas an infallible plan to eventuallywin), and 〈〈jamesbond, bondsgirl〉〉 funU shot
(Bond and his current girlfriend have a collective way of having fun until
someone shoots at them).
A number of semantics have been defined for ATL, most of them equiva-
lent [6, 7]. In this paper, we use a variant of concurrent game structures asmod-
els. A concurrent game structure (CGS) is a tuple M = 〈Agt, St,Π, pi, Act, d, o〉
which includes anonemptyfinite set of all agentsAgt = {1, . . . , k}, a nonempty
set of states St, a set of atomic propositions Π, a valuation of propositions
pi : St → P(Π), and a set of (atomic) actions Act. Function d : Agt × St →
(P(Act)\∅) defines nonempty sets of actions available to agents at each state,
and o is a (deterministic) transition function that assigns the outcome state
q′ = o(q, α1, . . . , αk) to state q and a tuple of actions 〈α1, . . . , αk〉, αi ∈ d(i, q),
that can be executed by Agt in q.
A (memoryless) strategy sa of agent a is a conditional plan that specifies
what a is going to do for every possible situation: sa : St → Act such that
sa(q) ∈ d(a, q). We denote the set of such functions byΣa. A collective strategy
sA for a group of agents A is a tuple of strategies, one per agent from A; the
set ofA’s collective strategies is given byΣA =
∏
a∈A Σa. The set of all strategy
profiles is given by Σ = ΣAgt.
A path λ in modelM is an infinite sequence of states that can be effected
by subsequent transitions, and refers to a possible course of action (or a pos-
sible computation) that may occur in the system; by λ[i], we denote the ith
position on path λ. ΛM denotes all paths in modelM . The set of all paths
starting from q is given by ΛM (q). The subscripts will be omitted when the
model is clear from the context.
Function out(q, sA) returns the set of all paths that may result from agents
A executing strategy sA from state q onward. Let sA(a) denote agent a’s part
of the collective strategy sA.:
out(q, sA) = {λ ∈ Λ(q) | for every i = 1, 2, . . . there exists a tuple of agents’
decisions 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 such that αa = sA(a)(λ[i− 1]) for each a ∈ A, and
αa ∈ d(a, λ[i− 1]) for each a /∈ A, and o(λ[i− 1], α1, . . . , αk) = λ[i]}.
Formally, the semantics of ATL formulae can be given via the following
clauses:
M, q |= p iff p ∈ pi(q) (for p ∈ Π);
M, q |= ¬ϕ iffM, q 6|= ϕ;
M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, q |= ϕ andM, q |= ψ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 hϕ iff there is a collective strategy sA such that, for every
λ ∈ out(q, sA), we haveM,λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉2ϕ iff there exists sA such that, for every λ ∈ out(q, sA), we
haveM,λ[i] |= ϕ for every i ≥ 0;
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Figure 1: Simple concurrent game structure
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there exists sA such that for every λ ∈ out(q, sA) there
is an i ≥ 0, for whichM,λ[i] |= ψ, andM,λ[j] |= ϕ for every 0 ≤ j < i.
Example 1 Consider a very simple concurrent game structureM1, shown in Fig-
ure 1. There is only a single agent (a) in themodel. Example ATL formulae that hold
in states of the model are: M1, q1 |= p1,M1, q2 |= 〈〈a〉〉 hp1,M1, q2 |= ¬〈〈∅〉〉 hp1,
andM1, q2 |= 〈〈∅〉〉3p1.
It is worth noting that the path quantifiers A,E of CTL can be expressed in
ATL with 〈〈∅〉〉 , 〈〈Agt〉〉 respectively.
2.2 ATLwith Epistemic Logic
Real-life agents seldompossess complete information about the current state
of the world. On the other hand, imperfect information and knowledge
are handled in epistemic logic in a natural way. A combination of ATL and
epistemic logic, calledAlternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic (ATEL) was in-
troduced to enable reasoning about agents acting under imperfect informa-
tion [19].
ATEL enriches the picturewith an epistemic component, adding to ATL op-
erators for representing agents’ knowledge: Kaϕ reads as “agent a knows that
ϕ”. Additional operatorsEAϕ,CAϕ, andDAϕ, whereA is a set of agents, refer
tomutual knowledge (“everybody knows”), common knowledge, and distributed
knowledge among the agents from A. Models for ATEL extend concurrent
game structureswith epistemic accessibility relations∼1, . . . ,∼k⊆ Q×Q (one
per agent) formodeling agents’ uncertainty.2 We call suchmodels concurrent
2 The relations are assumed to be equivalences.
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Figure 2: Simple concurrent epistemic game structureM2
epistemic game structures (CEGS).3 Agent a’s epistemic relation is meant to en-
code a’s inability to distinguish between the (global) system states: q ∼a q′
means that, while the system is in state q, agent a cannot determinewhether
it is in q or q′. Then, the semantics ofKa is defined as:
M, q |= Kaϕ iffM, q′ |= ϕ for every q′ such that q ∼a q′.
Relations ∼EA, ∼CA and ∼DA , used to model group epistemics, are derived
from the individual relations of agents fromA. First,∼EA is the union of rela-
tions ∼a, a ∈ A. Next, ∼CA is defined as the transitive closure of ∼EA. Finally,
∼DA is the intersection of all the∼a, a ∈ A. The semantics of group knowledge
can be defined as below (forK = C,E,D):
M, q |= KAϕ iffM, q′ |= ϕ for every q′ such that q ∼KA q′.
Note that Ka ≡ C{a} ≡ E{a} ≡ D{a}, so individual knowledge operators Ka
are in fact redundant.
Example 2 Let us extend the CGS from Example 1 by adding some epistemic
links as shown in Figure 2. Example ATEL formulae that hold in states of the CEGS
are:M2, q1 |= p1;M1, q1 |= Ka¬p0;M1, q2 |= ¬〈〈∅〉〉 hp1; andM1, q2 |= 〈〈∅〉〉3p1.
It has been observed in several places that the meaning of ATEL formu-
lae can be counterintuitive [8, 12, 13]. Most importantly, one would expect
that an agent’s ability to achieve property ϕ should imply that the agent has
3 Additionally, we will assume that CEGS are uniform, i.e., agents have the choices in indistin-
guishable states (q ∼a q′ implies da(q) = da(q′)).
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enough control and knowledge to identify and execute a strategy that enforces
ϕ (cf. also [17]). ATEL does not preserve these requirements, as it implicitly
assumes that the layers of ability and knowledge are independent. Wedonot
deal with the issue explicitly here (an interested reader is referred to [12, 11]
for an extensive discussion). We point out, however, that the inclusion of
strategic constraints, presented in Section 3, allows e.g. to impose that the
agents use only uniform (executable) strategies.
3 Restricting Strategies of Agents
In many cases, it seems appropriate to put some constraints on the “good”
(allowed, legal etc.) behaviors. For instance, in scenarios with imperfect in-
formation we may consider only uniform strategies, i.e., ones that specify
same choices in indistinguishable states. Or, we may assume that agents are
only going to play strategy profiles that are in Nash equilibrium. We define
a class of such strategic constraints in this section, with the aim of showing
that our translation works well also for scenarios where agents’ choices are
additionally restricted.
Our constraints are based on the idea of plausibility sets [10], and general-
ize the behavioral constraints from the framework of social laws [18].
3.1 Strategic Constraints
A behavioral constraint in [18] is a function β : Agt × St → P(Act) that
specifies which actions can be “legally” played by agents. More specifically,
β(a, q) is the set of actions that a is allowed to play at state q. Naturally,
β(a, q) ⊆ d(a, q), and the inclusion may be strict. β(a, q) is assumed to im-
plement a social norm: agent a (when in state q) may be forbidden to play
some actions in his repertoire; if he decides to play them, he will violate the
norm.
Note that using constraints of this type implies that norms can only apply
to actions of individual agents (independently). It is therefore not possible
to specify e.g. that one is allowed to shoot in self-defense, i.e., right at the
moment when another person is trying to harmhim. Likewise, norms of that
type specify legal actions independently for each state. Thus, if we do not
accept lying, thenmaking a false statement will be always forbidden, even if
it is just a joke, and the speaker is going to disclose the truth in the very next
moment.
Here, we are looking for a model that enables to cope with such interrela-
tionships between the allowed actions of different agents at different states,
too. Another rationale for this comes from game theory. Unlike in norma-
tive systems, we are interested in “rational” rather than “moral” behavior
there, but the general pattern is the same. That is, some strategy profiles
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of agents (e.g., those in Nash equilibrium) are deemed “rational”, while the
others are rejected as “irrational”. Note that, especially forNash equilibrium,
the rationality of an action does depend on what the agent is going to do at
other states; even more: it also depends on what the other agents are going to
do at this and other states. Thus, our requirements with respect to agents’
behavior will be modeled as sets of strategy profiles.
When defining agents’ behavior via strategy sets, one assumes implicitly
that agents actually play strategies. In our case, it would for instance imply
that each agent does the same action every time the systemcomes back again
to one of the previous states (asmemoryless strategies are used in our seman-
tics of ATL). This is a very strong assumption, and we do not always want to
make it with respect to all agents. Thus, our strategic constraints will also
include the set of agents to whom the constraint should apply.
Definition 1 A strategic constraint is a pair η = 〈Υ, A〉, where Υ ⊆ Σ is a
non-empty set of strategy profiles andA ⊆ Agt is a set of agents.
Now we can define what it means for a strategy to be consistent with a
strategic constraint, and what is the outcome of a strategy under a strategic
constraint.
Definition 2 (Substrategy) Let A,B ⊆ Agt, and let sA be a collective strat-
egy for A. We use sA[B] to denote the substrategy of sA for agents from B only,
i.e., strategy tA∩B such that taA∩B = s
a
A for every a ∈ A ∩ B. We extend the nota-
tion to sets in a natural way: for a set of collective strategies ΥA ⊆ ΣA, we define
ΥA[B] = {t ∈ ΣA∩B | ∃sA ∈ ΥA.t = sA[B]}.
Definition 3 (Consistencywith a constraint) Let sA be a collective strat-
egy ofA ⊆ Agt, and η = 〈Υ, B〉 be a strategic constraint. Strategy sA is consistent
with constraint η iff the part of sA to which the constraint should apply occurs in
Υ, i.e., sA[B] ∈ Υ[A ∩B].
Additionally, for a strategic constraint η, we use η(sA) to denote all strategy pro-
files that are consistent with η and contain sA as substrategy.
Definition 4 (Outcome under constraint) LetM be a CGS, and q a state
in M . Furthermore, let sA be a collective strategy, and η = 〈Υ, B〉 be a strategic
constraint. The outcome of sA from q under constraint η contains all paths which
may result from agents A executing sA from q on, when only strategies complying
to η can be played by the opponents. As the constraint applies only to players from
B, and the strategy forA is given, η restricts in fact only choices ofB \A. Formally,
the set is defined as:
out(q, sA, η) = {λ ∈ Λ(q) | there is t ∈ ΣA∪B, consistent with η, such that t[A] =
sA and for every i = 1, 2, . . . there exists a tuple of agents’ decisions 〈α1, . . . , αk〉
for which: αa = ta(λ[i− 1]) for a ∈ A∪B, αa ∈ d(a, λ[i− 1]) for a /∈ A∪B,
and o(λ[i− 1], α1, . . . , αk) = λ[i]}.
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The following properties are immediate.
Proposition 1 out(q, sA, η) = ∅ iff sA is inconsistent with η.
Proposition 2 For every sA,Υ, we have that sA is consistent with 〈Υ, ∅〉.
Proposition 3 Let η = 〈Υ, B〉. Then:
out(q, sA, η) =
⋃
t∈η(sA)[A∪B]
out(q, t).
The last property is an immediate corollary of Proposition 3:
Proposition 4 For every q, sA,Υ, we have that out(q, sA) = out(q, sA, 〈Υ, ∅〉).
3.2 Abilities under Strategic Constraints: Semantics
The intuition behind strategic constraints is rather simple: for a constraint
η = 〈Υ, B〉 we assume that the actual collective strategy of agents B must
occur somewhere in Υ. Note that the agents from B do not have to be all in
the same coalition –B can collect both “proponents” and “opponents”. The
formal semantics of ATL formulae in the presence of strategic constraints is
given by the clauses below.
M, q, η |= p iff p ∈ pi(q) (for p ∈ Π);
M, q, η |= ¬ϕ iffM, q, η 6|= ϕ;
M, q, η |= ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, q, η |= ϕ andM, q, η |= ψ;
M, q, η |= 〈〈A〉〉 hϕ iff there is a collective strategy sA, consistent with η,
such that for every λ ∈ out(q, sA, η)we haveM,λ[1], η |= ϕ;
M, q, η |= 〈〈A〉〉2ϕ iff there exists sA consistent with η, such that for every
λ ∈ out(q, sA, η)we haveM,λ[i], η |= ϕ for every i ≥ 0;
M, q, η |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there exists sA consistent with η, such that for ev-
ery λ ∈ out(q, sA, η) there is an i ≥ 0, for which M,λ[i], η |= ψ, and
M,λ[j], η |= ϕ for every 0 ≤ j < i.
ConsidermodelM1 from Example 1, and let us assume that p0 ≡ p1 ≡ lose,
and p1 ≡ win. Moreover, we assume that a rational agent would like to win as
quickly (and as often) as possible. The following strategic constraint captures
the assumption that the agent fromM1 is rational: η = 〈{[q0 7→ α, q1 7→ α, q2 7→ α]}, {a}〉,
where [q0 7→ α, q1 7→ α, q2 7→ α] is the strategy that specifies that a plays α in
states q0, q1 and q2.4 Then, we have for instance that M1, q, η |= 〈〈∅〉〉 hwin
4 Note thatΣ = Σa inM1 since there is only one agent in that model.
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for each state q: a rational agentmust win immediately in the nextmoment,
regardless of the initial position.
A useful example of strategic constraints are so called uniform strategies.
We mentioned in Section 2.2 that a realistic notion of ability under imper-
fect information should only refer to executable strategies. Uniform strate-
gies capture this requirement in a simple way. We say that sa is uniform iff,
for every q, q′, q ∼a q′ implies that sa(q) = sa(q′); that is, agent amust specify
same choices in states that look the same to him. A collective strategy sA is
uniform iff it consists only of uniform individual strategies. Let Σua denote
the set of uniform strategies of agent a. Then ΣuA =
∏
a∈A Σ
u
a is the set of col-
lective uniform strategies of A, and Σu = ΣuAgt is the set of uniform strategy
profiles. Now, the requirement that agents from A should only use uniform
strategies can be captured by the strategic constraint η = 〈Σu, A〉.
Consider CEGSM2 from Example 2. For that model, the requirement that
the only agent sticks to executable strategies can be captured by the con-
straint η = 〈{[q0 7→ α, q1 7→ α, q2 7→ α], [q0 7→ α, q1 7→ β, q2 7→ β]}, {a}〉.
The semantics of knowledge under strategic constraints is defined in a
straightforward way: agents know that ϕ under η iff ϕ holds under η in ev-
ery indistinguishable state. Note that this implicitly implies that the actual
strategic constraint is common knowledge among the agents.
M, q, η |= Kaϕ iffM, q′, η |= ϕ for every q′ such that q ∼a q′.
M, q, η |= KAϕ iff M, q′, η |= ϕ for every q′ such that q ∼KA q′ (where K =
C,E,D).
We observe that strategic constraints influence only properties that in-
volve strategic modalities 〈〈A〉〉 (Proposition 5). Moreover, for a constraint
η = 〈Υ, B〉, only B’s part of the profiles from Υ matters, as the following
proposition shows (Proposition 6). Finally, properties of the original ATL
can be seen as properties under a constraint that applies to nobody (Proposi-
tion 7).
Proposition 5 Let η1, η2 be strategic constraints, and let ϕ be a formula that
contains no cooperation modalities 〈〈A〉〉 . Then, for everyM, q, we haveM, q, η1 |=
ϕ iffM, q, η2 |= ϕ.
Proposition 6 Let Υ1,Υ2 ⊆ Σ such that Υ1[B] = Υ2[B]. Then, for every
M, q, ϕ, we haveM, q, 〈Υ1, B〉 |= ϕ iffM, q, 〈Υ2, B〉 |= ϕ.
Proposition 7 M, q |= ϕ iffM, q, 〈Υ, ∅〉 |= ϕ.
4 TranslatingKnowledge toStrategicAbility
ATL is trivially embedded into ATEL since all ATL formulae are also ATEL
formulae. Moreover, every concurrent game structure can be extended to
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a concurrent epistemic game structure by defining all epistemic relations to
be equalities, i.e. all agents have no uncertainty about the current state of
the system. Finding an interpretation the other way is more involved. We
will first construct a satisfaction-preserving interpretation of the fragment
of ATELwithout distributed knowledge (wewill call it ATELCE), and thenwe
will show how it can be extended to the whole ATEL, though at the expense
of some increase of the model size.
The interpretation we discuss here is an update of that proposed in [7,
9]. Two things are changed. First, we slightly change the transformation
of models so that, after visiting an “epistemic” state, the system always re-
turns immediately to its corresponding “action” state. In consequence, it is
possible to define the translation of formulae without exponential blowup
in their length. Second, we show that the translation is also correct whenwe
add constraints on the behavior of agents.
The original construction was inspired by [16], in which a propositional
variant of the BDI logic [15] had been proved to be subsumed by proposi-
tional µ-calculus. Similar translations are well known within modal logics
community, including translation of deontic logic into Propositional Dy-
namic Logic [14], translation of dynamic epistemic logic without common
knowledge into epistemic logic [5] etc. In all these cases multi-modal logics
are concerned, whichmakes it possible to “simulate” modalities of one kind
with modalities of another kind. A work particularly close to ours is [20],
where a (partial) reduction of ATEL model checking to ATL model checking
was presented for a limited subclass of CEGS.
4.1 Idea of the Translation
ATEL consists of two orthogonal layers. The first one, inherited from ATL,
refers towhat agents can achieve in temporal perspective, and is underpinned
by the structure defined via transition function o. The other layer is the epis-
temic component, reflected by epistemic accessibility relations. Our idea of
the translation is to leave the original temporal structure intact, while ex-
tending it with additional transitions to “simulate” epistemic accessibility
links. The “simulation” is achieved through adding new “epistemic” agents,
who can enforce transitions to special “epistemic” copies of the original states
(called “action” states in the extendedmodel). The “action” and “epistemic”
states form separate strata in the resultingmodel, and are labeled accordingly
to distinguish transitions that implement different modalities.
Note: unlike in [7, 9], the “epistemic” states are not faithful copies of the
corresponding “action” states. They copy neither the original valuation of
propositions, nor the outgoing transitions. Instead, each epistemic state
copies only the “epistemic” transitions of the original state, plus one tran-
sition that leads directly to the corresponding “action” state.
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Figure 3: Newmodel: “action” vs. “epistemic” states, and “action” vs. “epis-
temic” transitions.
The interpretation consists of two independent parts: a transformation
of models and a translation of formulae. First, we propose a construction
that transforms every concurrent epistemic game structure M for a set of
agents {1, ..., k}, into a (pure) concurrent game structure M ′ over a set of
agents {1, ..., k, e1, ..., ek}. Agents 1, ..., k are the original agents from M (we
will call them “real agents”). Agents e1, ..., ek are “epistemic doubles” of the
real agents: the role of ei is to “point out” the states that were epistemi-
cally indistinguishable from the current state for agent i in M . In order to
distinguish transitions referring to different modalities, we introduce addi-
tional states in model M ′. States qei1 , ..., q
ei
n satisfy new proposition ei added
to enable identifying moves of epistemic agent ei. Moreover, epistemic state
qei has the same “epistemic” transitions as q (leading to epistemic copies of
states indistinguishable from q), plus one outgoing transition leading to the
corresponding “action” state q. The original states q1, ..., qn are still inM ′ to
represent targets of “action” moves of the real agents 1, ..., k. We will use a
new proposition act to label these states. Now, the type of a transition can be
recognized by the label of its target state. The idea of the transformation is
depicted in Figure 3.
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Defining the transition function o so that both epistemic and “action”
transitions can occur is the trickiest part of the construction. We achieve this
by giving priority to the epistemic agents’ decisions. Every epistemic agent
can choose to be “passive” and let the others decide upon the next move,
or may try to effect an “epistemic” move. The resulting transition leads to
the state selected by the first non-passive epistemic agent. If all the epis-
temic agents decided to be passive, the “action” transition chosen by the
real agents follows. Again, “epistemic” states are given a special treatment,
as the real agents have no substantial choice there. Thus, if all the epistemic
agents decide to be passive at an “epistemic” state, the system proceeds to
the corresponding “action” state.
With the above construction inmind, ATEL formulae can be translated to
ATL according to the following scheme:
• Kiϕ can be rephrased as ¬〈〈e1, ..., ei〉〉 h(ei ∧ 〈〈e1, ..., ek〉〉 h(act ∧ ¬ϕ)):
the epistemic moves to agent ei’s epistemic states do not lead to a state
where ϕ fails (more precisely: where ϕ fails in the corresponding “ac-
tion” state). Note that player ei can select a state of his if, and only if,
players e1, ..., ei−1 are passive (hence their presence in the cooperation
modality). Note also thatKiϕ canbe aswell translated as¬〈〈e1, ..., ek〉〉 h(ei∧
〈〈e1, ..., ek〉〉 h(act∧¬ϕ))or¬〈〈1, ..., k, e1, ..., ek〉〉 h(ei∧〈〈1, ..., k, e1, ..., ek〉〉 h(act∧
¬ϕ)): when ei decides to be active, choices from 1, ..., k and ei+1, ..., ek
are irrelevant.
• 〈〈A〉〉 hϕ becomes 〈〈A ∪ {e1, ..., ek}〉〉 h(act ∧ ϕ) in a similar way.
• Translation of the other temporal operators is now more straightfor-
ward than in [7, 9]: 〈〈A〉〉2ϕ canbe rephrased as 〈〈A ∪ {e1, ..., ek}〉〉2(act∧
ϕ), and 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ becomes 〈〈A ∪ {e1, ..., ek}〉〉(act ∧ ϕ)U (act ∧ ψ). This
is possible because the construction of epistemic states (and the trans-
lation ofKa) ensures that strategic (sub)formulae will be always evalu-
ated in “action” states. We observe that the new translation of2 and U
does not involve exponential increase in the length of formulae (con-
trary to the construction from [7, 9]).
• Translation of mutual knowledge (EA) is analogous to the individual
knowledge case. Translation of common knowledge refers to the defi-
nition of relation ∼CA as the transitive closure of relations ∼i for i ∈ A:
CAϕmeans that all the (finite) sequences of appropriate epistemic tran-
sitions must end up in a state where ϕ is true.
The only operator that does not seem to lend itself to a translation ac-
cording to the above scheme is the distributed knowledge operator D, for
which we seem to need more “auxiliary” agents. Thus, we will begin with
presenting details of our interpretation for ATELCE – a reduced version of
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ATEL that includes only common knowledge and “everybody knows” oper-
ators for group epistemics. Section 4.3 shows how to modify the translation
to include distributed knowledge as well.
4.2 InterpretingModels and Formulae of ATELCE into
ATL
4.2.1 TransformingModels
Given a concurrent epistemic game structureM = 〈Agt, St,Π, pi, Act, d, o,∼1, ...,∼k〉,
we construct anewconcurrent game structureM ′ = 〈Agt′, St′,Π′, pi′, Act′, d′, o′〉
as follows:
• Agt′ = Agt∪Agte, whereAgte = {e1, ..., ek} is the set of epistemic agents;
• St′ = St ∪ Ste1 ∪ ... ∪ Stek , where Stei = {qei | q ∈ St}. We assume that
St, Ste1 , ..., Stek are pairwise disjoint. Further we will be using the more
general notation Sei = {qei | q ∈ S} for any S ⊆ St;
• Π′ = Π ∪ {act, e1, ..., ek};
• pi′(p) = pi(p) for every proposition p ∈ Π. Moreover, pi′(act) = St and
pi′(ei) = Stei ;
• Act′ = Act∪St∪{pass}: the newmodelM ′ contains the original actions
fromM , plus epistemic actions (pointing indistinguishable states), and
the “do nothing” action pass;
• d′a(q) = da(q) for a ∈ Agt, q ∈ St: choices of the real agents do not
change in the original (“action”) states;
• d′a(q) = {pass} for all a ∈ Agt, q ∈ St′ \ St: the real agents behave
automatically in the new (epistemic) states;
• d′ei(q) = img(q,∼i) ∪ {pass} for q ∈ St′: an epistemic agent can point
out an indistinguishable state or choose to remain passive;
• the new transition function is defined as follows:
o′(q, α1, ..., αk, αe1 , ..., αek) =

o(q, α1, ..., αk) if q ∈ St and
αe1 = ... = αek = pass
q0 if q = qei0 ∈ Steiand
αe1 = ... = αek = pass
(αei)
ei if ei is the first active
epistemic agent.
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e
actq0
q1q2
eq2 q1e
q0e
p1
p2
p0
,pass
pass,pass
pass,q1
pass,q0
pass,pass
pass,pass
,pass
,pass
,q0
,q1
,q2
,q2
,q1

,q2
,q

pass,q2
Figure 4: Reconstruction for the concurrent epistemic game structure from
Figure 2.
We assume that all the epistemic agents fromAgte, states from Ste1 ∪ ...∪Stek ,
and propositions from {act, e1, ..., ek}, are new andwere absent in the original
modelM .
Example 3 The transformation of the simple CEGS from Figure 2 is shown
in Figure 4. 
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4.2.2 Translation of Formulae
Now,we define a translation of formulae fromATELCE to ATL corresponding
to the above transformation of models:
tr(p) = p, for p ∈ Π
tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ)
tr(ϕ ∨ ψ) = tr(ϕ) ∨ tr(ψ)
tr(〈〈A〉〉 hϕ) = 〈〈A ∪ Agte〉〉 h(act ∧ tr(ϕ))
tr(〈〈A〉〉2ϕ) = 〈〈A ∪ Agte〉〉2(act ∧ tr(ϕ))
tr(〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ) = 〈〈A ∪ Agte〉〉(act ∧ tr(ϕ))U (act ∧ tr(ψ))
tr(Kiϕ) = ¬〈〈e1, ..., ei〉〉 h(ei ∧ 〈〈e1, ..., ek〉〉 h(act ∧ ¬tr(ϕ)))
tr(EAϕ) = ¬〈〈Agte〉〉 h(( ∨
ai∈A
ei) ∧ 〈〈e1, ..., ek〉〉 h(act ∧ ¬tr(ϕ)))
tr(CAϕ) = ¬〈〈Agte〉〉 h〈〈Agte〉〉( ∨
ai∈A
ei
)U (( ∨
ai∈A
ei) ∧ 〈〈e1, ..., ek〉〉 h(act ∧ ¬tr(ϕ))).
4.2.3 Extending Strategic Constraints
Given a strategic constraint η = 〈Υ, B〉 in M , we must extend it to match
the type of constraints inM ′ (becauseM ′ includes more agents thanM , and
in consequence the elements of Υ, which are full strategy profiles inM , are
only partial profiles inM ′). This can be done in many ways; here, we explic-
itly assume that the additional (epistemic) agents can use any strategies they
like. The new constraint must apply to the agents from B, plus (possibly) to
some of the new agents from Agte. That is, agents from B are constrained in
the same way as before, agents from Agt \ B are unconstrained in the same
way as before, and the new agents can be put under constraints or not – but
even if they are, they can play any available strategy.5
Definition 5 Let η = 〈Υ, B〉 be a strategic constraint in concurrent epistemic
game structureM , and letM ′ be the concurrent game structure obtained fromM
by the construction presented in Section 4.2.1. We say that constraint η′ = 〈Υ′, B′〉
extends η inM ′ iff:
1. Υ′ = Υ× ΣAgte , and
2. B ⊆ B′ ⊆ B ∪ Agte.
5 We recall that the assumption that a player plays amemoryless strategy is itself a restriction
on the agent’s behavior.
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4.2.4 Properties of the Translation
First, we show that the translation is correct; then, we discuss the complexity
of the resultingmodels and formulae.
Theorem 8 Let ϕ be a formula of ATELCE ,M be a CEGS, and q ∈ St an “ac-
tion” state in M . Furthermore, let η be a behavioral constraint in M , and let η′
extend η inM ′. Then,M, q, η |= ϕ iffM ′, q, η′ |= tr(ϕ).
Proof. The proof follows by structural induction on ϕ. We will show that the
construction preserves the truth value of ϕ for four cases: ϕ ≡ p, ϕ ≡ ¬ψ,
ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉2ψ and ϕ ≡ Kaψ. An interested reader can tackle the other cases in
an analogous way.
case ϕ ≡ p, ATELCE ⇔ATL. M, q, η |= p iff q ∈ pi(p) iff q ∈ pi′(p) iffM ′, q, η′ |=
p iffM ′, q, η′ |= tr(p).
case ϕ ≡ ¬ψ, ATELCE ⇔ATL. M, q, η |= ¬ψ iffM, q, η 6|= tr(ψ) iff (by induc-
tion)M ′, q, η′ 6|= tr(ψ) iffM ′, q, η′ |= ¬tr(ψ) iffM ′, q, η′ |= tr(¬ψ).
case ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉2ψ, ATELCE ⇒ATL. Let M, q, η |= 〈〈A〉〉2ψ, then A have a
collective strategy sA, consistentwith η, such that for everyλ ∈ outM (q, sA, η)
and i ≥ 0 we have M,λ[i], η |= ψ (*). Consider strategy tA∪Agte in the
new model M ′, such that taA∪Agte(q) = s
a
A(q) for all a ∈ A, q ∈ St,
and taA∪Agte(q) = pass for all a ∈ Agte. In other words, tA∪Agte is a
strategy according to which the agents from A do exactly the same
as in the original strategy sA for all the “action” states from St (and
pass elsewhere), while the epistemic agents remain passive all the time.
Note that tA∪Agte is consistent with η′ (as tA∪Agte [B] = sA∩B must oc-
cur in Υ′[B] = Υ[B], and all the strategies of Agte are allowed in Υ′ in
all possible combinations).6 Since all the epistemic agents pass, every
λ ∈ outM ′(q, tA∪Agte , η) includes only “action” states from St (**), and
thus every such λ is also a path inM . As the agents from Amake the
same choices in sA, tA∪Agte , and η, η′ agree on their parts that are rele-
vant forM , we obtain that outM ′(q, tA∪Agte , η′) = outM (q, sA, η). By (*):
for every λ ∈ outM ′(q, tA∪Agte , η′) and i ≥ 0 we haveM,λ[i], η |= ψ. By
induction we get that for every λ ∈ outM ′(q, tA∪Agte , η′) and i ≥ 0 we
haveM ′, λ[i], η′ |= tr(ψ). By (**), alsoM ′, λ[i], η′ |= act for all such λ, i.
In consequence,M ′, q, η′ |= 〈〈A ∪ Agte〉〉2(act ∧ tr(ψ)).
case ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉2ψ, ATL⇒ATELCE. LetM ′, q, η′ |= 〈〈A ∪ Agte〉〉2(act∧tr(ψ)).
Then, there is tA∪Agte , consistent with η′, such thatM ′, λ[i], η′ |= act ∧
tr(ψ) for allλ ∈ outM ′(q, tA∪Agte , η′) and i ≥ 0. By the fact thatM ′, λ[i], η′ |=
act, we can infer that all such paths λ consist only of “action” states,
6 We recall thatB ⊆ Agt.
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and thus they are also paths inM . By the induction hypothesis, it fol-
lows thatM,λ[i], η |= ψ for all λ ∈ outM ′(q, tA∪Agte , η′) and i ≥ 0. Now,
let sA = tA∪Agte [A]. We observe that sA is a strategy inM as well; more-
over, sA is consistent with η, as it is a part of an η′-consistent strategy,
and η, η′ agree on their parts referring to the agents from Agt. Finally,
the epistemic agents in tA∪Agte always remain passive, which means
that only the choices ofA are relevant for the actual course of action, so
outM ′(q, tA∪Agte , η′) = outM (q, sA, η). Summing it up, we get that there
is sA, consistentwith η, such thatM,λ[i], η |= ψ for all λ ∈ outM (q, sA, η)
and i ≥ 0. In consequence,M, q, η |= 〈〈A〉〉2ψ.
case ϕ ≡ Kiψ, ¬ATL⇒¬ATELCE. LetM ′, q, η |= 〈〈e1, ..., ei〉〉 h(ei∧〈〈e1, ..., ek〉〉 h(act∧
¬tr(ψ))). Then, there is a collective choice 〈αe1 , ..., αei〉 such that ei (*)
and 〈〈e1, ..., ek〉〉 h(act ∧ ¬tr(ψ)) (**) hold in the next moment (for ev-
ery response from the rest of agents).7 By (*) we have that αe1 = ... =
αei−1 = pass and αei = qx with the epistemic link q ∼a qx present in the
original CEGSM (note also that the choices of the other agents are irrel-
evant). Moreover, the next state is going to be qeix . By (**) we have that
M ′, qeix , η
′ |= 〈〈e1, ..., ek〉〉 h(act ∧ ¬tr(ψ)). The only choice of {e1, ..., ek}
at qeix that guarantees that act holds next is αe1 = ... = αek = pass,
and the subsequent state will be qx. In consequence, it must hold that
M ′, qx, η′ |= ¬tr(ψ), i.e, M ′, qx, η′ 6|= tr(ψ). Note that qx is an “action”
state, so by induction we get that M, qx, η 6|= ψ. But this means that
M, q, η |= ¬Kψ, as q ∼a qx.
case ϕ ≡ Kiψ, ¬ATELCE ⇒¬ATL. We have M, q, η 6|= Kaψ, so there is qx
with q ∼a qx andM, qx, η 6|= ψ. By induction, we getM ′, qx, η′ 6|= tr(ψ).
As qx is an action state, it holds that M ′, qx, η′ |= act ∧ ¬tr(ψ). Con-
sider the “epistemic” state qeix in M ′, and the collective choice αe1 =
... = αek = pass at that state. First, the choice is consistent with η
′
(all choices from the epistemic agents are); second, it enforces a tran-
sition to qx, so M ′, qeix , η′ |= ei ∧ 〈〈e1, ..., ek〉〉 h(act ∧ ¬tr(ψ)). But the
epistemic agents {e1, ..., ei} have a collective choice at q that enforces
a transition to qeix , namely αe1 = ... = αei−1 = pass, αei = qx. Thus,
we getM ′, q, η′ |= 〈〈e1, ..., ei〉〉 h(ei ∧ 〈〈e1, ..., ek〉〉 h(act∧¬tr(ψ))), which
concludes the proof.

Note that the construction used above to interpret ATELCE in ATL has sev-
eral nice complexity properties. In the following list, k denotes the number
of agents, p the number of propositions, n the number of states,m the num-
ber of transitions, andm the number of epistemic links in the original CEGS
7 Note that every collective strategy of {e1, ..., ei} is consistent with η′ by definition.
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M . Likewise, k′, p′, n′,m′ denote the number of agents, propositions, states
and transitions in the resulting CGSM ′.
• The vocabulary (set of propositions Π) and the set of agents only in-
crease linearly: p′ = p+ k + 1 = O(p+ k) and k′ = 2k = O(k).
• The set of states in an ATEL-model grows linearly, too: n′ = (k + 1)n =
O(kn).
• Wehavem′ = m+ k(m+1) = O(m+ km) transitions inM ′ (m “action”
transitions andm epistemic transitions from “action” states, plusm+1
transitions from each “epistemic” state).
• The length of formulae also increases linearly: l ≤ l′ ≤ l(8+5k) = O(kl).
Note also that the transformation of models and formulae is straightfor-
ward, and in consequence its complexity is noworse than the corresponding
complexities of the resulting structures.
4.3 HandlingDistributed Knowledge
In order to interpret the full ATEL we modify the construction from Sec-
tion4.2 by introducing additional epistemic agents (and states) indexedwith
coalitions which occur with a distributed knowledge operator:
• Agte = {ei | i ∈ Agt} ∪ {eA | DA ∈ ϕ};
• St′ = St ∪⋃i∈Agt Stei ∪⋃DA∈ϕ SteA .
Accordingly, we extend the language with new propositions {ei | i ∈ Agt}
and {eA | DA ∈ ϕ}. The choices of collective epistemic agents eA refer to the
(epistemic copies of) states accessible via distributed knowledge relations:
• d′eA(q) = {pass} ∪ img(q,∼DA )eA .
The new transition function extends the one from Section 4.2 with choices
of agents eA (putting them in any predefined order, e.g. alphabetical order):
o′(q, α1, ..., αk, αe1 , ..., αek ,
..., αeA , ...) =

o(q, α1, ..., αk) if q ∈ St and
αa = pass for alla ∈ Agte
q0 if q = qei0 ∈ Steiand
αa = pass for alla ∈ Agte
(αea)
ea if ea is the first active
epistemic agent.
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The translation of formulae for all operators of ATELCE remains the same
as well, and the translation ofDA is:
tr(DAϕ) = ¬〈〈Agte〉〉 h(ei ∧ 〈〈Agte〉〉 h(act ∧ ¬tr(ϕ))).
The following result can now be proved similarly to Theorem 8.
Theorem 9 Let ϕ be a formula of ATEL,M be a CEGS, and q ∈ St an “action”
state inM . Furthermore, let η be a behavioral constraint inM , and let η′ extend η
inM ′. Then,M, q, η |= ϕ iffM ′, q, η′ |= tr(ϕ).
This construction, too, does not involve any substantial increase of com-
plexity:
• p′ = O(p+ k + l),
• k′ = O(k + l),
• n′ = O(kn+ ln),
• m′ = O(m+ km+ lm),
• l′ = O(kl).
Still, it has one disadvantage when compared to the construction from Sec-
tion 4.2: in the previous construction (for ATELCE), models and formulae
could be translated independently; in our construction for full ATEL, the
transformation of a model depends on the formula which is going to be
model-checked. Thus, it is not possible any more to “pre-compile” a given
CEGS in advance, and then model-check on the fly any formulae that will
become relevant.
5 Conclusions
In this report, we propose an update of the reduction scheme that was pre-
sented in [7, 9]. The original reduction allowed to get rid of epistemic op-
erators by translating them to cooperation modalities of ATL which made
use of additional “epistemic” agents. The new version has two new features.
First, we avoid the exponential blowup of formulae, which was to some ex-
tent present in the original reduction. Second, we show that the reduction
is valid also if we specify strategic constraints which restrict collective strate-
gies that some (or all) agents are allowed to use. Thus, the applicability of
the new reduction scheme goes well beyond ATEL (i.e., perfect information
ATL + knowledge operators). We can use the scheme to translate knowledge
to strategic ability for agents playing under imperfect information (like in
ATLir from [17]), acting in the presence of social norms [18], or choosing only
rational play [10]. It seems that many other extensions of alternating-time
temporal logic should submit to the reduction, too.
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